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Over the years, a broad array of mainly financial vari- 
ables has  been proposed for use in formulating and 
implementing monetary policy. This collection of 
papers examines the potential value of these various 
measures as intermediate targets and/or indicators of 
monetary policy. It includes a review of the Federal 
Reserve's evolving approach to the use of policy tar- 
gets and operating guides in the postwar period. It also 
contains an analysis of the recent academic literature 
on the theory of policy rules that is relevant to the 
potential usefulness of intermediate targets. 
Systematic analysis of monetary tactics and strategy 
in light of  the relationships among policy instruments, a 
broad array of monetary and financial  variables  and 
measures of economic performance, began to expand 
rapidly in the late 1950s. Over the subsequent decades 
the  subject has generated a large body of literature. 
One early source of motivation for this work was mon- 
etarist criticisms of the Federal Reserve's post-Accord 
procedures. In these procedures, the  behavior of the 
money  stock played,  at most,  only a limited role. 
Another impetus to the literature on monetary tactics 
was progress in modeling the markets for reserves and 
money.  This work provided far greater analytical and 
quantitative detail on the connection between Federal 
Reserve actions and the response of the reserve and 
money aggregates than had previously been available. 
Continuing controversy over the appropriate role of 
money stock targets sustained and intensified interest 
in the question of intermediate targets and their imple- 
mentation in the 1960s and 1970s.  Interest in the sub- 
ject was  especially intense in the period after the 
October 1979 announcement of a change in operating 
procedures designed to improve the implementation of 
targets for the monetary  aggregates.  By the early 
1980$, signs of an emerging breakdown in the existing 
relationships of the money measures to the economy 
generated  suggestions that money stock targets be 
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Quarterly Review. augmented or replaced by broad measures of liquid 
assets and credit. As the extent of the shift in the re- 
lationship of all these various measures to GNP 
became more apparent, however,  research interest in 
their use as intermediate targets or indicators waned 
and their role in policy making diminished. More 
recently, as discussed in  the  relevant papers in  this 
volume, some interest has been expressed by econo- 
mists and policy makers in possible roles for nominal 
GNP and/or -for market measures such as commodity 
prices, the yield curve, and foreign exchange rates as 
policy targets and/or indicators. 
In general, however, confidence that there exist finan- 
cial  measures that can replace in part or in whole  a 
basically judgmental, pragmatic, and eclectic approach 
to policy seems currently (1990) at a rather low ebb. 
Virtually without exception, the results reported in this 
volume support such a skeptical attitude. Nevertheless, 
as argued below, the issue is far from closed. Indeed, 
interest in the problem of devising and implementing 
"intermediate"  guides for policy is likely to prove a 
hardy perennial in the years ahead. 
Some terminology  - 
One product of the debate on these issues has been 
the development of a useful and  reasonably settled 
vocabulary to discuss them. One can imagine a spec- 
trum of economic measures that has, at one end, the 
"ultimate  targets" of monetary  policy. These almost 
always include the price level  and  real  output and 
sometimes also include the behavior of the balance of 
payments and the foreign exchange value  of the dollar. 
At the other end of this spectrum are  the  "instru- 
ments" of monetary policy. These include open market 
operations, the  discount rate, and  in  earlier periods, 
required reserve ratios and Regulation Q ceilings  on 
deposit interest rates. Just one step along the spec- 
trum beyond these instruments are "operating targets," 
measures that can be controlled  with a rather high 
degree of precision through manipulation of the policy 
instruments. Potential operating targets include meas- 
ures such as nonborrowed reserves, the nonborrowed 
monetary base, and short-term money market rates, 
most notably the federal funds rate. Borrowings from 
the discount window clearly also constituted a potential 
operating target under the system of lagged  reserve 
accounting  that prevailed  between  1968 and  1984, 
-  since the Trading Desk could take required reserves as 
predetermined  within  any reserve  averaging period. 
Even under the present system of approximately con- 
temporaneous reserve accounting, most people would 
probably-  still want to count borrowings as a potential 
operating  target—though  to achieve  it in any given 
reserve maintenance period means that  the Desk must 
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correctly estimate required  reserves in the current 
period as well as market factors  supplying reserves 
and the levels of excess reserves. 
"Intermediate" measures,  whether considered as 
"targets" or as "indicators," are variables that, as the 
term suggests, are intermediate between (1) the instru- 
ments and operating targets that are capable of rather 
tight control and (2) the ultimate target measures that 
can only be influenced indirectly. Measures of the 
money stock are perhaps the classic examples of such 
"intermediate" variables, but as noted, the list includes 
other broad financial  aggregates, such as  credit 
extended to.  the nonfinancial sectors, as well as market 
measures, such as the foreign exchange rate, that are 
thought to be significantly influenced by movements in 
the operating targets. 
Some measures, as discussed in more detail in the 
appropriate papers, are a little harder to classify. Thus, 
for example, short-term interest rates are usually 
treated as operating targets  but may also be treated as 
intermediate targets. Conversely, the monetary base is 
most often discussed as an intermediate measure but 
sometimes, more controversially, is viewed as a poten- 
tial operating target.  Nominal GNP is sometimes 
treated as a potential  intermediate  measure, at one 
step removed from its ultimate target components of 
prices and real output. 
The various intermediate  measures  may have the 
potential to serve as intermediate "targets" and/or as 
intermediate "indicators" of monetary policy. "Targets" 
are, obviously enough, objectives the Federal Reserve 
seeks to achieve over some time period with some 
degree of precision and under some particular set of 
circumstances. The concept acquired legislative status 
with the 1975 congressional  resolution requiring  the 
Federal Reserve to report on its "plans and objectives 
with respect to the growth of the monetary and credit 
aggregates over the coming year," language that- was 
repeated in the Humphrey-Hawkins  legislation of 1978. 
The  concept of an "intermediate target"  seems to imply 
that to qualify, a measure should be (a) reasonably 
subject to control by the Federal  Reserve through 
adjustment of its operating targets and (b) reasonably 
closely (that is, predictably) related to the ultimate tar- 
gets or, in  practice, at least to nominal GNP. Conse- 
quently, the papers in this volume examine the various 
measures considered as potential intermediate targets 
from both points of view. 
The concept of intermediate measures as monetary 
"indicators" is a bit more complicated  because it is 
sometimes taken to mean a measure of the stance of 
monetary policy and  is sometimes interpreted as an 
indicator of  current or future developments in the econ- 
omy. In much of the earlier literature (early 1960s), the term was interpreted in the sense of indicators of the 
stance of monetary policy—that is, as measures that 
could provide, in  some sense, an index of monetary 
"ease"  or "restraint." The attempt to pin down such an 
index produced, and  indeed continues to produce, a 
certain  amount of confusion and ambiguity. Consider, 
for example, a situation in which the Federal Reserve 
is using interest rates as an operating target and has 
no intermediate target objective for the money stock. 
Suppose on entering a recession, the  policy makers 
progressively lower their interest rate target, but, owing 
to the recession-induced decline in the demand for 
money, the money stock falls (probably along with a 
drop in total reserves). Measured in terms of inten- 
tionality, policy has clearly "eased," because the 
declining short-term rates are, at least in large part, 
the direct result of policy decisions to ease. But if one 
believes that it is not intentionality but rather the 
impact of policy on the economy that matters, and if 
one also believes that this impact is best signaled by 
the money stock,  then in this instance, the declining 
money stock indexes not an "easing" but a "tightening" 
of policy. 
This may be a terminological problem in the sense 
that one may want to talk about an indicator of policy 
intentions or an indicator of policy impact and these 
may not be the same thing. But the distinction between 
measures of intention and measures of impact, if they 
are in fact different, may also raise an econometric 
issue:  how to decide which  intermediate measure, if 
any, should be treated as "predetermined" for estimat- 
ing purposes.  In this example, the money •stock or 
short-term rates? 
In any case, the recent technical literature has ten- 
ded to focus on intermediate "indicators"  (sometimes, 
in this context, also called "information variables") not 
as measures of the stance of policy, but as measures 
of the present or prospective state of the economy. 
This is the sense in which the term is generally used in 
the present volume. To be sure, there are places in the 
literature where the two senses of a monetary "indica- 
tor" are conflated. For example, a rise  in commodity 
prices or a steepening of the yield curve may be taken 
as indicating both that the prospects are for rising infla- 
tion in the future and that policy has been "easy"  or, 
perhaps, "too easy." 
Clearly, the main requirement for a good intermedi- 
ate indicator of the state of the economy is that it be 
reliably (predictably) related to the current or prospec- 
tive behavior of ultimate goals such as inflation and/or 
real output. In practice, statistical tests have often 
been couched in terms of the relationship of the meas- 
ure to nominal GNP. 
A  question arises whether a measure that has proved 
to be a good indicator in this sense can then be used 
as an intermediate target  while still continuing to be a 
good indicator.  It has sometimes been asserted that 
when a financial aggregate such as the money stock 
becomes an intermediate target, presumably chosen in 
part because  of its good indicator properties,  these 
properties will then be altered (for the worse?) by the 
very fact of its targeting by the authorities. This may or 
may not be a problem with respect to financial aggre- 
gates that are treated both as intermediate targets and 
indicators.  It clearly could be a complicating  issue, 
however, for such market measures  as commodity 
prices, interest rates, and the foreign exchange rate. 
Knowledge  in  the market that the behavior of the 
measure is being used by the authorities to make pol- 
icy decisions is very likely to alter that behavior. Partly 
for this  reason, proponents of these latter measures 
have generally advocated them for only a single pur- 
pose:  for example, commodity  prices and the yield 
curve, simply as indicators; interest rates and the dol- 
lar, either as indicators or as operating or intermediate 
targets, but not  both as indicators and as targets. 
Is there a case for IntermedIate targets? 
It is clear that a coherent monetary policy requires a 
decision on operating targets. It is equally clear that 
"indicator" measures providing  advance  information 
about the current or prospective state of the economy 
are, almost by definition, of value. The usefulness of 
• intermediate  monetary targets,  however, has  always 
been more controversial. No measure selected for such 
a role will ever be perfectly predictably related to the 
ultimate targets that matter. At least  some uncertainty, 
some short-term instability, and some longer term drift 
in the relationship of any intermediate target to final 
objectives seems inevitable. 
It has therefore been argued that the use of inter- 
mediate targets will result in suboptimal decisions. Pol- 
icy makers  will adjust their operating targets, not 
directly in terms of the settings most likely to achieve 
their ultimate objectives but,  instead, in terms  of the 
settings most likely to achieve the intermediate target. 
According to this line of thought,  intermediate meas- 
•ures such as the money supply may be useful, at best, 
as variables that may shed light on (1) the current state 
of the economy, perhaps because of more prompt re- 
porting, or (2) the economy's prospective future state, 
because of leading indicator properties. On the other 
hand, their use as intermediate targets is likely only to 
produce  poorer  control  over ultimate targets than  if 
instruments were adjusted directly in terms of objec- 
tives for these latter targets. 
The logic of this criticism of intermediate measures 
as targets seems impeccable. Nevertheless, it misses 
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case that encompasses a much wider range of consid- 
erations. This broader  case  envisions a number  of 
potential benefits from the use of intermediate targets. 
It has been argued, for example, that intermediate tar- 
gets can  usefully provide a means of communicating 
the central  bank's intentions to the public.  Moreover, 
such targets can  provide a form of central bank 
accountability. 
The ultimate target measures may not be well suited 
for these various purposes. Thus, as discussed in the 
paper on  nominal GNP targeting, there may  be  real 
problems in having an independent central bank set or 
announce goals for ultimate  targets. Equally to the 
point,  actual  economic performance  over any given 
period is subject to many important influences in addi- 
tion to monetary policy. Hence it may be quite inap- 
propriate to judge the success of this policy by the 
actual performance of the economy—that  is, by the 
ultimate target measures—given the role of nonmone- 
tary influences. By contrast, an intermediate target —  a 
goal for the rate of money growth, for example  —  can 
be judged in advance for its probable consistency with 
acceptable economic outcomes. Moreover, it can be 
• used to judge, ex post, whether the central bank's day- 
to-day decisions have been appropriate to achieving its 
intermediate target objective. Moreover,  the existence 
of an intermediate target, defined  over time periods 
such as a year, can be useful to the central bank as an 
internal check  on  the appropriateness of the shorter 
term settings of its operating targets.1 
But there are other fundamental arguments for the 
use of intermediate targets  — provided suitable targets 
can be found. Thus it has generally been argued that 
over the long run, monetary policy can only affect nom- 
inal magnitudes.  Its longer run  influence over real 
growth,  real interest rates,  and employment  mainly 
reflects its success or lack of success in achieving an 
environment in which economic decisions can be made 
with a minimum of concern and uncertainty about price 
level instability. If this view  is correct, the  appeal of 
intermediate targets in providing a "nominal anchor" 
for policy decisions is fairly  clear. Such targets can pro- 
vide, in  principle,  an indication that the longer  run 
thrust of policy will be consistent with longer run goals 
for price behavior. In principle, at least, any one of the 
various monetary and credit aggregates could, if used 
as intermediate targets, provide this kind of "nominal 
anchor" for policy—as could nominal GNP. 
1lhese various arguments  were cited in a speech. "The Contributions 
and Limitations of 'Monetary' Analysis," given by Paul A. Voicker  in 
September 1976 and most recently reprinted in the 75th anniversary 
issue of the Federal Reserve  Bank of New York's Quarterly Review, 
May 1989. 
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Another role that has been suggested for intermedi- 
ate targets is in dealing with the potential conflict that 
may exist between short- and long-run optimal policy, 
an issue known as the "time consistency problem" in 
the academic literature and in  more informal discus- 
sions as the "credibility  problem." A conflict  between 
short-run  and long-run optimizing can arise from the 
fact that in the short run, the monetary authorities can 
probably engineer some extra real output, at least up 
to a point. They can only do this, however, through an 
expansionary policy that yields more inflation than is 
built into the public's expectations. According to widely 
accepted theory, increases in  wages and  prices that 
are more rapid than expected will "fool" the public into 
supplying more labor and goods under the  mistaken 
impression that the higher wages and prices represent 
higher real rewards. 
In the short run, there may be pressure on the cen- 
tral bank to seek output gains  through such "surprise" 
inflation. But once the public comes to recognize that 
the policy makers are operating in a way that acceler- 
ates inflation, the public will anticipate this accelera- 
tion. Put simply, the attempt to boost output through 
policies that create surprise inflation will be self-defeat- 
ing. Over time, the public will catch on, and the higher 
inflation will no longer be a "surprise." Inflation that is 
anticipated will have no power to induce higher output. 
Thus over the longer run, the effort to induce higher 
output through excessively stimulative policies will fail. 
Output will be no higher than it otherwise would have 
been  —  trending at its potential rate  over time  — but the 
rate of inflation will be higher. Thus on balance, stimu- 
lative policies that seem attractive  period by period 
will, over the longer run, simply result in higher inflation 
without any output gains—a result desired by no one. 
An intermediate target, publicly announced and faith- 
fully adhered to, could, in theory, avoid this kind of out- 
come. It could do so by effectively tying the hands of 
the authorities,  preventing them from yielding to the 
temptation to seek  short-run output gains in a process 
that over the longer run only guarantees higher infla- 
tion. Probably the best known prescription for using an 
intermediate target in this way is the constant money 
growth "rule" or, in some versions, money growth tar- 
gets that settle  down to such a rule after some period 
of accommodation  to disequilibrium initial cOnditions. 
Of course a monetary growth rule also has potential 
disadvantages. Thus while  it may ensure reasonable 
long-run price stability, it makes  no provision for 
accommodating  shocks—whether from supply or 
demand  — and thus may achieve long-run price stability 
only at the expense of unsatisfactory shorter run out- 
comes for both output and prices. It might be possible 
to design a more complex monetary growth rule that allows money growth to adjust to such short-run distur- 
bances, but in a predetermined way that still prevents 
the authorities from seeking short-run output gains at 
the expense of higher average inflation. However, mon- 
etary rules that embody such automatic response fea- 
tures may themselves create credibility problems  — as 
discussed in the paper in this collection that reviews 
the "time consistency" literature. 
It has to be emphasized that all these various poten- 
tial virtues of intermediate targets  — improved accoun- 
tability,  improved communication with the public, 
provision of a nominal anchor, and prevention of short- 
run decisions that serve merely to raise inflation over 
the longer run —  can be achieved only if suitable target 
measures exist. As noted earlier, "suitable" in this con- 
text means measures  that are "sufficiently" controllable 
and "sufficiently" stable in their relation to the ultimate 
objectives. But this is not an all or nothing matter. No 
intermediate target will be perfectly controllable, even 
over a year. And no measure will be related in a per- 
fectly predictable way to the ultimate targets. At least 
some slippage on both  counts is  inevitable.  On the 
other  hand, even if there is some slippage, the benefits 
derived from intermediate targeting may, over the 
longer run, outweigh the costs that arise as a result of 
this slippage. Clearly it is a matter of more or less — 
that is, a question  of how much  slippage can be 
expected from the use of intermediate targets, on the 
one hand, and how much one values their potential 
longer run benefits on the other. Typically,  individuals 
most concerned with long-run inflation results have ten- 
ded to minimize the problems with intermediate targets, 
while those most concerned with the shorter run real 
output consequences have tended to worry most about 
these problems. 
Evaluating the candidates 
Eight papers in this volume examine individual candi- 
dates or groups of candidates  —  for example, the multi- 
ple measures of money  and credit—as  potential 
targets and/or indicators of policy. While the  papers dif- 
fer somewhat in  organization and emphasis, they all 
touch on certain common issues. These include (1) the 
theoretical basis for believing that the particular meas- 
ures in question might be useful targets or indicators, 
(2) the statistical evidence for believing a relationship 
to ultimate targets exists and evidence for the stability 
of any such  relationship,  (3) issues of central  bank 
control,  and (4) the  question  whether the measure, 
even if not used as a formal target, might be useful in a 
subordinate role.  For example, the paper on interest 
rates considers the possibility that even if interest rates 
make little sense as an intermediate target, upper and 
lower bounds for real short-term rates might neverthe- 
less be useful as "constraints" on settings for an inter- 
est rate operating target. 
As  noted  earlier, the most frequently advocated 
measures for intermediate targeting over the past three 
decades have been the various measures of the money 
stock and the monetary base, and more recently, liquid 
assets  and various credit measures. The statistical 
results for these measures form a vast literature vary- 
ing in method, sophistication,  periods  covered, and 
conclusions. This literature is summarized and evalu- 
ated in some detail in the individual papers in this vol- 
ume. It may be useful here,  however,  to give some 
crude sense of the problems that developed for these 
measures in the 1980s. 
Charts 1 to 6 show the departure from trends of the 
GNP velocities of a number of potential intermediate 
target measures in the 1980s. These departures are 
clearly large in all cases—greatest for Ml, the mone- 
tary base, and nonfinancial  credit; less for M2, M3, and 
liquid assets. These departures from past experience 
are fairly easy to explain in some cases.  Thus the 
velocity of narrow  money  (and  the  monetary  base) 
almost certainly fell because of declines  in  inflation, 
nominal interest rates, and hence the opportunity cost 
of holding these measures. Explanations in the case of 
the broader measures that internalize  the effects of 
market interest rate movements  seem less clear. 
In any case, the same pattern of major departures 
from earlier postwar relationships is evident in Table 1, 
showing regressions of growth in nominal GNP on cur- 
rent and lagged growth in these various financial meas- 
ures. As  the error measures suggest, equations 
estimated on data from 1960 to 1979 do a very poor job 
in estimating GNP growth in the 1980s. And as Table 2 
shows, similar equations estimated over data from  1981 
to 1989 have almost no explanatory power, with coeffi- 
cients that are not significant (indeed usually negative!) 
for all measures except the monetary base. This kind 
of result makes clear the reasons for the growing disil- 
lusionment in recent years with the potential of these 
measures as intermediate targets or indicators. 
The other  property required of a potential intermedi- 
ate target (as opposed to indicator) is of course con- 
trollability, and that poses a different set of problems. 
Some of the broader measures, such as total liquid 
assets  and aggregate credit, are clearly not closely 
related to Federal Reserve operating targets. They can 
perhaps only be controlled indirectly — that is,  by first 
controlling GNP! The narrower measures such as Ml 
and M2 have clearly retained substantial interest rate 
sensitivity for horizons out to a year or so because 
many  of their component own-rates respond only 
slowly to changes in market rates. As a result, growth 
in such measures may be rather sensitive to changes 
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86  87  88  89 in interest rate operating targets. That very sensitivity 
is itself a problem, however.  Thus it makes the GNP 
outcome associated  with any successfully-achieved 
growth rate target for the aggregate quite sensitive to 
shifts in the demand for goods and services — at least 
over periods out to a year or so. Use of such targets, 
therefore, either will imply a wide range of uncertainty 
about the GNP outcome associated with a given money 
growth  rate or will make it seem desirable to define 
targets in terms of broad ranges of growth rates. This 
latter approach, however,  clearly weakens the useful- 
ness of such targets for many of the purposes they are 
designed to serve. 
The breakdown in earlier relationships between 
financial  aggregates  and nominal  GNP in the  1980s 
has lead a number of academic writers to suggest that 
the velocity problem could be "solved" by targeting 
nominal  GNP directly.  Such an approach  has some 
attractive  features. A long-run  nominal GNP growth 
rule set in light of the expected trend growth  in real 
output would establish a "nominal anchor" for policy. 
Adhered to as a "rule," with or without automatic feed- 
back mechanisms, it would solve the short run/long run 
inconsistency  problem  and  would satisfy the other 
objectives of an intermediate target. In the short run, 
adherence to a nominal  GNP target would automat- 
ically offset both the price and  the real effects of 
demand shifts and  would split the impact of supply 
shifts between real output and prices. 
Unfortunately, the nominal GNP approach appears to 
V = 2.49 + 1.18M1 
(2.39) (6.29) 
V  1.43 + 0.85M2 
(0.99) (5.19) 
V  1.57 + 0.75M3 
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(0,25) (5.69) 
V  1.00 + 0.87Debt 
(0.59) (4.54) 
V  2.72 + 0.9SBase 
(2.34) (5.33) 
have equally large problems.  First, it "solves" the 
velocity problem  only on the assumption that there 
exists a way of accurately achieving a nominal GNP 
target with  the  means at the disposal of the  central 
bank. Obviously the method of choice would not be 
through intermediate money targets, for that would sim- 
ply reintroduce the velocity problem. A different option 
would be to aim at GNP targets through constant reset- 
tings of an interest rate operating target. Clearly suc- 
cess with such an approach is far from assured. 
A second difficulty is that to get a handle on final 
objectives  with  a nominal  GNP target, you  need to 
have a predictable relationship between nominal GNP 
and output in the short-run—that  is, you need to be 
able to predict the  price/output split  resulting from a 
given GNP result, at least to the extent that you have 
short-run output objectives. But of course this problem 
is shared with other potential intermediate targets such 
as money growth rates. 
A third difficulty is that a fixed nominal GNP rule 
could, under quite plausible conditions examined in the 
GNP  paper in this volume,  generate problems of 
dynamic instability in the path of real output  in the face 
of supply shocks and, apparently, in the face of prior 
misses in hitting the nominal  GNP objective. Such 
problems can be avoided by resetting, on a discretion- 
ary basis, the nominal GNP target year by year. But 
this approach would create a very uncomfortable situa- 
tion for a central bank that is "independent within the 




Table  1 
Summary Statistics from Reduced  Form Equations 
1960-Il to 1979-tV 
R  SEE 
Average 
DW  Error 
Average 
Absolute Error  RMSE 
0.34  3.66  2.05  —4.13  5.72  6.16 
0.24  3.92  1.86  —0.38  3.55  4.48 
0.23  3.94  1.86  —0.55  3.40  4.49 
0.30  3.78  2.01  —0.97t  3.67t  4.54t 
0.29  3.80  2.08  —2.65t  4.35t  4.77t 
0.27  3.85  1.92  —2.40  3.99  4.41 
Notes: All equations regress the growth rate of nominal GNP on the current and four  tagged growth rates of the  financial aggregate. 
Figures in parentheses  are "t' values. L  represents the Federal Reserve  Board's measure of liquid assets. 
t1980-l to 1989-Ill 
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for real growth and inflation. Such a situation could well 
create pressures for precisely the kind of short-term 
optimization that produces the worst of all possible 
worlds  over the long  run—that is, it would  seem to 
maximize the risks of creating the kind of "time consis- 
tency" problem cited earlier. Overall,  it seems quite 
possible that as a practical matter, discretionary nomi- 
nal GNP targeting could result in worse inflation out- 
comes than  might exist in the absence of  any 
intermediate  target at all.  In summary, the nominal 
GNP route appears, on closer examination, to be no 
panacea for the problems created by the velocity insta- 
bilities  of the 1980s. 
The remaining measures examined in  this  volume, 
commodity  prices, the yield curve, and the foreign 
exchange value of the dollar, have generally been pro- 
posed as intermediate indicators that might be used to 
guide settings of the operating targets, rather than as 
intermediate targets themselves. Because these mar- 
kets are often regarded as efficient in incorporating rel- 
evant economic information, they could perhaps signal 
changes in the economic outlook very quickly. 
In the case of commodity prices, it seems likely that 
these prices could in fact be targeted through direct 
open market operations in commodity markets. Indeed, 
that is just what a "commodity standard," whether 
defined in terms of a basket of commodities or a single 
commodity such as gold, would involve. Instead of such 
Y = 5.85 + 0.16M1 
(4.17) (1.03) 
V = 7.21 ÷ 0.01M2 
(2,88) (—0.02) 
V = 8.05 + 0.06M3 
(3.16) (—0.21) 
V = 9.46 + 0.21L 
(3.33) (—0.21) 
V = 10.80 + 0.3ODebt 
(2.85) (—0.90) 
V = 0.37 + .99Base 
0,12) (2.56) 
operations, it has been suggested  merely that com- 
modity prices may represent sensitive advance indica- 
tors of changes in general inflation rates that can be 
used to signal the need to tighten or ease the conven- 
tional operating targets. 
The results surveyed  in the paper  on commodity 
prices  included in this volume suggest that movements 
in commodity price indexes do have a marginal contri- 
bution,  but only a marginal contribution,  to.  make in 
forecasting  inflation. As leading indicators  of turning 
points in broad movements in the overall inflation rate, 
commodity price  measures,  suitably averaged  and 
smoothed, do have some predictive  value.  But they 
have also at times  given false  signals of turning points 
in the general inflation rate. In the case of correct sig- 
nals, moreover, their lead times  tend to be rather vari- 
able and there appears to be little relation between the 
magnitude of commodity price movements and the 
magnitudes of subsequent movements in overall infla- 
tion. On balance, it appears that commodity prices may 
be reasonable additions to the items the central bank 
"looks at" when it surveys the prospects for inflation. 
They do not, however, add much to more conventional 
methods of assessing the outlook for inflation. 
Another market measure that has been proposed as 
an indicator but not as a target of monetary policy is 
the yield curve. In this case, the question whether the 
measure  is to be thought of as an indicator of the 
stance of policy or an indicator of the future course of 
the economy is somewhat ambiguous. And this ambi- 
guity is directly related to the theoretical assumptions 
the attention sometimes given to the yield 
curve for either  or both of these roles. Belief in the 
indicator properties of the yield curve appears to rest 
on the expectations theory  of the yield curve—the view 
that  longer term rates  should  be  regarded  as 
(weighted) averages of the market's expectations of the 
future  course of successive short rates. While this the- 
0.06  3.67  1.36  ory has considerable intuitive appeal, empirical tests  of 
002  3  76  1 31  its validity  over the years have produced mixed results.  •  .  . 
Even if the expectations theory of the yield curve is 
0  3.79  1.33  accepted as correct, moreover, the theoretical implica- 
tions of particular yield curve configurations, as inter- 
0.06t  3.69f  1.38t  pretations both of monetary policy and of prospective 
0.07t  3.66t  economic performance, appear to be ambiguous. This 
ambiguity stems in part from another widely accepted 
0.16  3.48  1.51  theoretical premise—that nominal interest rates reflect 
the sum of a real rate and an inflation premium that 
allows for the expected rate of inflation over the life of 
the instrument. Thus an upward rising yield curve, for 
example, could imply either that the market expects 
real •short-term rates to rise in the future or that it 
expects the rate of inflation to rise. 
Against this background,  the paper on the yield curve 
Table  2 
Summary  Statistics 
Form Equations 
1981-I to 1989-IV 
from Reduced 
A2  SEE  DW 
Notes: All equations regress the growth rate of  nominal GNP 
on the current and four  lagged growth rates of  the financial 
aggregate. Figures in parentheses  are "t' values. L represents 
the Federal Reserve  Board's measure of  liquid  assets. 
t1981-l to 1989-Ill 
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a central bank to interpret the significance of, for exam- 
ple, a steepening of the yield curve on the  basis of 
theoretical considerations  alone. Such a steepening 
could mean that  the market expects inflation to acceler- 
ate, which the central bank could interpret as a need to 
tighten.  Alternatively,  it could mean that the market 
expects a rise in the productivity of capital and hence a 
rise in real short-term rates and an acceleration of real 
growth. This cause of a steepening in the yield curve 
might or might not imply a need to change the settings 
of operating  targets depending on circumstances. A 
third possibility is that the steepening reflects a market 
judgment about the future of monetary policy itself— 
that  is, that policy  is  expected to tighten, real  short 
rates to rise, and therefore, quite possibly, real growth 
to slow. So a central bank looking at a change in the 
yield curve must try to sort out its possible meanings 
and  then must decide what implications,  if any, the 
change may have for policy. 
Despite these interpretive ambiguities at the theoreti- 
cal level, the yield curve paper gives some fairly con- 
crete results. It suggests, for example, that the Federal 
Reserve does have significant power to affect the yield 
curve by changing the federal funds rate as an operat- 
ing measure. Since no one proposes the yield curve as 
a target, however, this is of rather limited significance. 
But the paper goes on to suggest that the yield curve, 
simply as an empirical matter, has proved to have sig- 
nificant forecasting value for both real output and infla- 
tion, even in the presence of other forecasting 
variables such as short-term interest rates, the leading 
indicators, and the consensus of economists' forecasts. 
One has to wonder, however, how this forecasting 
value might  be affected if the yield curve were to 
become a major forecasting tool for the authorities and 
if the market were to become aware of such a  develop- 
ment and were to respond accordingly. A kind of "two- 
person game" situation between the market and the 
authorities might  greatly  distort the  behavior of the 
yield curve relative to what it would be in the absence 
of a belief in its indicator significance. 
Finally,  the increasing sensitivity of the U.S. economy 
to international developments  has led to growing inter- 
est in  the  use of the  foreign exchange value  of the 
dollar as a guide for U.S. monetary policy. However, the 
paper on this topic  emphasizes  that, because of impor- 
tant differences between exchange rates and more tra- 
ditional variables,  the systematic use of the dollar's 
value in U.S. monetary policy  operations is likely to be 
highly  problematic  and would  almost  certainly raise 
considerations beyond those traditionally incorporated 
in U.S. policy deliberations. In particular, manipulation 
of policy instruments to regularly counter or "target" 
dollar movements could be destabilizing for the U.S. 
economy  under a wide  range of circumstances  and 
could require a significant degree of international pol- 
icy coordination. 
The paper does suggest  that exchange rates can 
play a useful role as policy indicators  but generally 
only under fairly limited circumstances. At times, for 
example,  foreign exchange  market conditions have 
proved helpful in gauging market perceptions and the 
likely reactions to policy changes. Beyond these cir- 
cumstances, however, the evidence raises considerable 
doubts about the reliability of exchange rates as regu- 
lar indicators of underlying inflation pressures or the 
monetary policy stance. Accordingly, on present knowl- 
edge, the case for upgrading the role of the dollar in 
U.S. monetary policy  formulation appears questionable. 
A future for intermediate  targets? 
The  cumulative effect of the papers included in this vol- 
ume is to leave one impressed with the limitations of a/I 
the various measures, certainly as intermediate targets 
and, for the most part,  even simply as indicators. But if 
all potential  intermediate targets have problems, it is 
also important to recall the many ways in which policy 
conducted without any such  target is itself  less than 
satisfying. 
In practice, conducting policy without  reference to 
intermediate targets means setting operating targets 
directly in line with changing assessments of the likely 
outcomes for the ultimate goal variables. Perhaps most 
often, this will mean adjusting some money market rate 
in line with changing projections of the future behavior, 
under assumed paths for such a rate, of prices and 
real output. 
The  difficulties of this approach to policy making are 
numerous. Perhaps the most obvious problem is the 
need to assess correctly the future state of the econ- 
omy  under alternative assumptions about settings of 
the operating targets. Note that it is the future state of 
the economy that  matters  given  the  universally 
acknowledged existence of significant lags in the 
impact of policy on output and prices. While there is 
substantial evidence  that experienced  macro fore- 
casters can improve significantly on naive extrapolative 
procedures in projecting the future, it is also clear that 
forecasting remains  as much an art as a science. 
Macro forecasting normally reflects a blend of reliance 
on econometric models,  interpretation of incoming 
information (both statistical and "anecdotal")  on the 
current state of the economy, and the selective use of 
an array of leading  indicator  measures. While  such 
forecasting is clearly  useful — indeed, absolutely nec- 
essary given the lags of policy's  impact—it  is also 
obviously fallible. As a further complication, policy 
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or explicit, that are conditional on multiple alternative 
settings of the operating variables under consideration. 
The well-known limitations on the ability to forecast 
raise the risk,  moreover, that policy makers will find 
themselves putting undue weight on the current  state 
of the economy despite the acknowledged importance 
of lags in the process. And of course absent intermedi- 
ate targets, policy-making  procedures do not readily 
lend themselves to an "objective," quantitative way of 
communicating the intentions of policy to the public or 
of evaluating its success after the fact. Even more 
serious, an approach that relies on setting  operating 
targets in light of projected future economic outcomes 
fails to provide a "nominal anchor" for policy and does 
nothing to solve the conflict between period-by-period 
and long-run optimizing in policy making. 
So we have a real tension here. On the one hand, 
intermediate  targets, if suitable ones exist, have the 
potential for improving the overall performance of mon- 
etary policy, especially  over the longer run. But,  to 
repeat,  "suitable"  means not merely controllable, but 
sufficiently  tightly related to ultimate  goals that slip- 
pages can be ignored and thus the forecasting problem 
bypassed. The experience of  the 1980s has left serious 
doubts that such "suitable" target measures do in fact 
exist. Faced with this tension, the Federal Reserve has 
in practice compromised. It has continued to set inter- 
mediate targets  for money and credit aggregates  — as, 
indeed, it is required to do by law—but it has defined 
these targets in terms of rather wide ranges (generally 
4 percentage points for annual growth rates). Moreover, 
on occasion the Federal Reserve has felt free to allow 
even these wide  ranges to be violated when it has 
appeared likely that the targets could be achieved only 
at the expense of inferior economic outcomes—or at 
least outcomes that are "inferior" within the one-year 
time horizon of the current targeting process. The tar- 
get measures have been given more attention when at 
the top or bottom of their ranges, with particular atten- 
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tion focused on the behavior of M2. In summary, inter- 
mediate targets have continued to exist, but only as 
rather  wide  ranges and  without any clearly  defined 
means of connecting  them with day-to-day or month-to- 
month operational decisions. 
Even under these circumstances, the extant inter- 
mediate targets have had some value in  providing a 
"nominal anchor"—though one that tends to drag a bit 
— and have provided a means of connecting, if some- 
what loosely, short- to intermediate-run objectives with 
the longer run objectives for price performance. Nev- 
ertheless, it is apparent that their usefulness for these 
purposes falls far short of what, at least in theory, 
could be provided by more formal adherence to a satis- 
factory intermediate target. 
The broad appeal of the intermediate target  concept 
is such that interest in  it seems bound to persist. 
Research on the subject has continued,  both within 
and without the Federal Reserve System. In particular, 
some economists at the Federal Reserve Board have 
developed evidence to suggest that long-run M2 veloc- 
ity may have retained  enough stability to make M2 
behavior a useful indicator of the longer run behavior 
of inflation. In the meanwhile, it is possible that after 
the major  shocks to the monetary  aggregates  (and 
possibly also to broad credit measures) from financial 
innovation and deregulation in the 1980s, these aggre- 
gates may settle down to a pattern of behavior that, if 
changed from earlier  decades, has nevertheless again 
become predictable enough to be useful. 
The future role of intermediate targets in the policy- 
making process is certainly  likely to depend in part  on 
such  potential developments. But given the short-run 
slippages that would inevitably persist between inter- 
mediate targets and ultimate objectives even under the 
best of circumstances, the future role of intermediate 
targets probably also depends on the weight that is 
given to the objective of long-run price stability. It is in 
the context of such an objective that the potential 
usefulness of intermediate targets is particularly clear. 